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RESTORATION OF DEPRIVED RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure concerns itself primarily with securing justice
for the accused. The rights of the accused are accorded strict ob-
servation to the end that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. All too often, however, the pris-
oner, once convicted, is no longer served by uniform legal rights
and procedural guarantees. He is subject not only to deprivation of
certain rights, but to a wide variety of penal theories. It is highly un-
fortunate that too little attention is devoted to penal methods and
rights of prisoners and ex-convicts generally in what might be re-
ferred to as the field of law proper. This field has been substantially
left within the province of criminologists, penologists, and sociologists.
It will be the purpose of this discussion to examine the loss of certain
civil rights upon conviction of a felony, and further, how these rights
might be restored while serving the best interests of justice.
FELONY AND CIVIL RIGHTS DEFINED
To the layman, the word "felon" connotes a vividly unfavorable
image. A felon is "one that is wicked . . . [a] villain." 1 The word
originated in European feudalism-a social, economic, and military sys-
tem based on mutual obligation between lord and vassal, in which the
unforgivable sin was the breach of fealty. At that time feudal disloyalty
was a threat to the entire social structure and therefore merited the
sanctions of forfeiture of all property, in addition to capital or corporal
punishment.2 Breaches of feudal obligations thus punished were labeled
felonies.
The English common law adopted this terminology to impose for-
feiture for serious breaches of the peace and the word "felony" gradu-
ally came to signify crime rather than a form of punishment.' Parlia-
1. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 836 (3d ed. 1961).
2. 4 TucKER's BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 94-96 (1803).
3. 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 357-58 (1923). One theory that the
word "felon" is derived from the Latin term meaning "venomous" or "poisonous" is
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ment enlarged the list of felonies, which was then carried to America
by the colonists where further enlargement occurred4
Because of the broad spectrum of acts that are classified as crim-
inal, modem statutes tend to define "felony" simply in terms of punish-
ment.' The Virginia statute is typical: "Offenses are either felonies or
misdemeanors. Such offenses as are punishable with death or confine-
ment in the penitentiary are felonies; all other offenses are misde-
meanors." ' Since sentences to a penitentiary, as opposed to a city or
county jail, generally must extend for a minimum of a one year period,
such a statutory definition means that a felony is an offense punishable
by imprisonment for at least one year. Some statutes explicitly so state.7
So defined, the term "felony" includes a wide variety of offenses.
Along with such typical common law felonies as murder and forcible
rape, statutory offenses such as seduction under promise to marry,8
statutory rape,9 and wife beating ° are often included. Anyone found
guilty of committing one of these offenses is, upon conviction, clas-
sified as a felon regardless of the punishment actually imposed," and
even when the sentence is actually suspended.' 2 Once within this cate-
gory, the convicted felon loses certain civil rights and becomes sub-
ject to certain civil disabilities which will follow him forever.
It is now appropriate to define exactly what is meant by the term
civil rights. The loss of civil rights in this context does not involve the
connotations that presently attach to the term, namely the freedom
from discrimination and prejudice. Two basic categories of depriva-
tions result from felonious criminal activity. First, certain basic rights
consistent with early common law usage as an expression of the threat that outlawry
posed to uncertain royal authority.
4. In America, the new states so expanded the number and types of crimes charac-
terized as felonies that as early as the close of the eighteenth century, James Madison
complained that felony had become a "term of loose significance" varying from state
to state and changing "with every revision of its criminal law." TiH FEDERALISr No. 42,
at 260-61 (H. Lodge ed. 1892) (Madison).
5. The felony-misdemeanor distinction, it is said, is based "upon the sentence possible
under a statute . . . and not at all upon the nature of the offense." United States v.
Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
6. VA. CODE AN. § 18.1-6 (1960 repl. vol.).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1958). "Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year is a felony."
8. CAL. PEN. CODE § 268 (West 1955); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2175 (McKinney 1967).
9. N.Y. PENt. LAw § 2010 (McKinney 1967).
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 273(d) (West 1955).
11. State v. Bowser, 155 Kan. 723, 727, 129 P.2d 268, 271 (1942).
12. See, e.g9, Whitlock v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 279, 280, 58 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1933).
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are lost automatically upon conviction of a felony. The loss of these
rights arises by operation of law and is a simple consequence of con-
viction. This category includes the loss of. such rights as suffrage.
Rights lost in this manner may usually be restored by pardon. A second
category concerns professional privileges. In this group, criminal ac-
tivity may subject the convict to severe deprivations, but these dep-
rivations rest in the discretion vested in a professional disciplinary
agency. In this category are found cases involving loss of the right
to practice medicine, law,13 etc., and pardon does not restore the
privileges lost. Restoration, like deprivation, rests within the discretion
of the professional regulatory board.
DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The rights lost upon conviction of a felony vary with the statutes
and customs of each state. The following are some of the most com-
mon rights of which a felon is deprived.
Suffrage
The most common civil right lost upon conviction of a felony is the
loss of the right to vote.14 The states have rather broad powers to set
voter qualifications, but statutes restricting the right to vote must be
closely scrutinized against the framework of both the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on
the right to vote which were designed "to promote [the] intelligent
use of the ballot," 15 and in several cases has cited laws excluding felons
from the electorate as example of statutes which serve this purpose.1"
Fairly early in American history, state courts approved such laws as
13. Sometimes deprivation of the right to practice one's profession does not fit the
crime. It is possible that neither the profession nor the public will suffer greatly if
the convicted felon is allowed to continue practicing his profession once he has paid
his debt to society. See, e.g., Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1939) (loss of
right to practice medicine because of perjury); Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48
(1935) (loss of right to practice law because of an assault.)
14. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. 6, § 4; WASH. CoNsr. art. 6, § 3; CoNw. GEN. STAT. ANN.
ch. 9, § 45 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-5 (1965), as amended, Laws 1967, H.B.
No. 693, § 1; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 111.060 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-112 (1964); N.Y.
ELECnON LAW § 152(2) (McKinney 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-18 (1964 repl. vol.).
15. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
16. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966) (dissenting opinion);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
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an attempt to "preserve the purity of the ballot box" based on the
premise "that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other
base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise
the privilege of suffrage .... ,, 17 More recent decisions also have de-
clared that such laws are enacted to serve a legitimate purpose.""
Right to Hold Public Office
A loss closely related to the deprivation of suffrage is that of the
right to hold public office and positions of public trust. Most states
deprive the convicted felon of this right as a measure of public pro-
tection.19 Once a person is rendered unqualified to vote, this will also
have the effect of rendering him unable to hold public office because
often a person must take an oath as a candidate for nomination that
he is a qualified elector of the state 20
Right to Serve as a Juror
Another right lost by virtue of a conviction for a felonious offense
is the right to serve as a juror.2 Again the deprivation is closely as-
sociated with voting rights and is usually effected by removing the of-
fender's name from the list of qualified electors.22 Since jury lists are
usually taken from the roll of qualified voters, felons are excluded.
Often statutes provide that the right to serve as a juror may be re-
gained when the person is restored to his civil rights, 3 so this is usually
a temporary loss.
Statutory provisions abrogating the right to serve on a jury have been
upheld on the ground that any state has the power to prescribe the
qualifications for the jurors who serve in its courts. 4 However, some
of these statutes have been construed to hold that the previous convic-
17. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
18. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal.2d 596, 603, 414 P.2d 412, 417, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966).
19. ARiz. CoNsr. art. 7, §§ 2, 15; FLA. CoNST. art. 6, § 5; ILL. CoNsT. art. 7, § 7.
20. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-101 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.021 (1961); N.Y. PuB.
Ouicmas LAW § 30 (McKinney 1952), as amended, ch. 692, [1967] N.Y. Sess. Laws.
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(2) (1961); MOIXTANA REV. STAT. ANN. § 93-1303(2) (1947);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1601 (1943); Wyo. STAT. A,N. § 1-78 (1957).
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (1961); as amended, ch. 67-149, [1967] Fla. Sess. Laws.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Duggar v. State, 43 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1949); People ex rel. Dennv v.
Traeger, 372 IMI. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679 (1939); Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 NE." 268
(1935).
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tion of a felony does not render the convicted person incompetent to
sit as a juror, but merely constitutes a ground of challenge for cause."
Right to Serve as a Witness
In most states, the convicted felon does not lose the right to serve
as a witness, although the conviction can generally be used to destroy
the credibility of his testimony. However, in some states, certain spe-
cific crimes can deprive the felon of the right to be a witness; for
example, in a few states the legislatures have specifically provided that
a person is incompetent to serve as a witness where he has been con-
victed of perjury.2"
Registration
Another restriction often imposed is the limitation on freedom of
movement. Many state, county, and city governments require that a
convicted felon register with the appropriately designated authorities
whenever he enters one of the various governmental areas with the in-
tention of remaining longer than a certain specified length of time.21
These statutes are justified on the theory that the interest of public
protection outweighs the restriction of movement placed on the indi-
vidual.
Right to Bear Arms
In most states, a felony conviction severely limits the right to bear
arms. For example, in Florida it is unlawful for a felon to own or to
25. Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953).
26. FLA. STAT. ANt. § 90.07 (1961); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.090 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1963).
27. See generally Cozart, The Benefits of Executive Clemency, 32 FED. PROS. 33
(June 1968). In this article there is a discussion of one of the most drastic registra-
tion requirements in existence. The City Council of Wilmington, Delaware, on Febru-
ary 3, 1966, passed an ordinance which provides that any resident of that city or anyone
who is even passing through the city for as much as two hours, and who has been
convicted of any one of a list of enumerated crimes within ten years of the date of
enactment of the ordinance and has not been pardoned, must within two hours of his
arrival in the city, register with the chief of police, furnish description of himself, be
photographed and fingerprinted, give his past address and local address, birthplace and
date, name of crime, place and date of conviction, penalty imposed, place of confinement,
furnish a description of the present or temporary address (whether hotel, motel, apart-
ment, residence, etc.) report all changes of residence, employment, etc., and carry with
him at all times an identification card. Failure to comply with the statute carries with
it for the first offender, a fine of up to one thousand dollars and ninety days in jail
and for all subsequent offenses a mandatory jail sentence of thirty days to six months.
[Vol. 10:924
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have in his care, custody, possession, or control any pistol, sawed-off
rifle or sawed-off shotgun, unless he has been restored to his civil
rights. 28 This type of statute is apparently upheld on the ground that
a balancing of interests between the public good and the individual's
rights justifies the restrictions placed on the individual's rights. Also,
some of the weapons involved in this deprivation are of a particularly
noxious character.
Professional Privileges
In most states, a number of professional privileges are subject to
forfeiture, usually at the discretion of special administrative boards.
Statutes regulating professions or occupations may prevent the felon
from qualifying as a chiropodist," engineer,30 liquor salesman,31 physi-
cian,32 private detective,33 real estate agent,34 or veterinarian. 5 Other
statutes give licensing authorities the discretion to exclude felons from
architecture,38 barbering, 37 nursing,38 and pharmacology. 0 Furthermore,
a felon cannot enjoy a career in the Army or Air Force, except in the
extraordinary cases of intervention by the Secretaries of the respective
branches.40
Such restrictions have long been allowed, the Supreme Court hav-
ing recognized the right of the state to set up various standards for
entry into professions affecting public interest. In Hawker v. New
York,4 the Court said:
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (1961); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 7897 (McKinney 1952). But
see, CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.17 (West 1956).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 461.03 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 144 (1963).
30. IOWA ANN. CODE 5 114.14 (1949) as amended, ch. 87, § 1, [1957] Iowa Sess. Laws;
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 322.050 (1963).
31. Ky. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 343.500 (1963); N.Y. ALco. BEy. CONTROL LAW § 126
(McKinney 1946).
32. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6502 (McKinney 1952); OEIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 493 (1963),
as amended, ch. 377, § 1, [1965] Okla. Sess. Laws. ("felony or crime involving moral
turpitude").
33. IowA ANN. CODE § 80A.5 (1949); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 74(2) (McKinney 1967).
34. N.Y. REAL PROp. LAw § 440-a (McKinney 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 847
(1963), as amended, ch. 97, § 5, [1968] Okla. Sess. Laws.
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4846 (West 1956); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6702 (McKinney
1952).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83-9 (1965).
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:4-40 (1963).
38. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 567.8 (1963).
39. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.26(c) (1963).
40. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3253 (a), 8253(a) (1958).
41. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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[The state] may require both qualification of learning and of
good character, and if it deems that one who has violated the
criminal laws of the state is not possessed of sufficient good char-
acter, it can deny to such a one the right to practice . .. ,
and, further, it may make a record of a conviction conclusive
evidence of the violation of the criminal law and of the absence
of the requisite good character. 42
Although there are indications that the Court is now willing to look
more closely at the decisions of the state legislatures which deny cer-
tain of their citizens the right to enter professional life,43 this general
rule regarding convicted felons still seems to prevail.44
RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
As can readily be seen, rights are lost through a variety of methods
in many states. The magnitude of the loss is compounded by numerous
and often ineffective methods of restoring these lost rights once the
felon has served his sentence.
Clemency
The best known method by which the rights of convicted persons
are restored is the exercise of clemency by the head of a state. It may
take several forms: pardon, commutation, amnesty, specific restora-
tion of rights, and specific remission of penalties. Pardon is probably
the most often used type of executive clemency and in many cases,
"courts have said that a pardon is a remission of guilt as well as of the
punishment, that it blots out the offense, so that in the eyes of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense...
It makes him, as it were, a new man." 4' The courts have not always
followed this assertion, however, and it seems proper to say [that] a
pardon merely stops legal punishment for the offense but does not give
the offender a better character.-6
By Operation of Law
In some jurisdictions the restoration of civil rights is simple and
automatic and is accomplished as a matter of law. In general these
42. Id. at 191.
43. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
44. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
45. S. Runmr, LAW OF CRIMINAL CoRRECnON 605 (1963).
46. Id. at 606.
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statutes provide that the rights that were lost when the sentence was
imposed are restored when the sentence is completedYt Completion of
the sentence occurs when the term of imprisonment expires48 or when
a parolee finishes his term of parole, either by expiration or early dis-
charge.49 It has been submitted that such a method of restoring lost
rights cannot be used effectively in conjunction with a conscientious
program of correctional rehabilitation. Indiscriminate restoration is
merely the reverse of indiscriminate deprivation, and might lead to a
reinvestment of rights in persons who are not worthy of them. Such
automatic action does not accomplish the "proper" objectives 50 and
should be condemned.
By Administrative or Judicial Discretion
In some jurisdictions the civil rights lost upon conviction or sentence
are subject to restoration at the discretion of an administrative agency,
usually a pardon or parole board,5 or the court of conviction acting ad-
ministratively. 2 The restoration may occur at the completion of pro-
bation or commitment,53 but in this type of procedure the board has
some discretion as to when and what rights may be restored.
Combination
Often times a combination of one of the three above methods is used
in restoring the felon's civil rights. For example, a board might recom-
47. Restoration by operation of law may occur from the language of the statute
providing for the loss of rights. Frequently the statute provides for "suspension" (not
loss) of rights during imprisonment. IDAHo GEN. LAws ANN. § 18-310 (1948). Others spe-
cifically provide for restoration of rights upon completion of the term. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.4 (West 1956) (guilt set aside at the completion of probation); Mo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 216.355(3) (1959); ORE. REv. STAT. §5 137.240, 137.250 (1965); Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 57.078 (1957).
48. S. Rumr, supra note 45 at 566.
49. OR. Rnv. STAT. H5 137.240, 137.250 (1965); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (1957).
50. See generally Note, Criminals' Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 328, 337
(1963). Rehabilitation without undue or unnecessary danger to society is the proper
objective of a penal theory.
51. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 4, S 12; A.A. ANN. CODE tit. 42, § 16 (1959); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 940.05 (1961); N.Y. Ex~cncvE LAw § 242 (McKinney 1952), as amended, ch. 356,
[1963] N.Y. Sess. Laws.
52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. AN. ch. 13, §§ 1-10 (1953); Omo ANN. CODE tit. 29,
52951.09 (1954).
53. See, e.g., CAl. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1956); CAL. WELFAm1 & INSTITUTIONS
CODE § 1772 (West 1966); WASH. ANN. CoDE § 9.95.240 (1961).
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mend to the head of the state, after a specified parole or probation
period, whether and what rights a felon is worthy of having restored.
It should be emphasized that in all of these methods of restoration.
professional status is not restored. Whether one can reacquire such status
or become licensed to practice a profession is still left to the discretion
of the professional board or licensing agent.
PROPOSED STATUTORY SOLUTION
Because of the variety of methods used in restoring civil rights to
convicted felons, it is not altogether surprising that many felons fail to
have their rights restored, partly because of ignorance of the law and
partly because of infirmities in the methods used. What is the best
method for restoring rights in a way that will best promote rehabilita-
tion without endangering society? It is contended that expungement
and sealing statutes will best accomplish this purpose.
Expungement is used here in the sense of dismissal, by which the
offender will be released from various penalties and disabilities resulting
from the conviction. The sealing statute will provide not only for
release from penalties, but also for the sealing of the record, so that
no information concerning even the fact of conviction can be dis-
closed or made public. A suggested expungement statute would then
read:
Every defendant who has been discharged from probation
shall at any time after the lapse of one year from the date of dis-
charge from probation, provided that he is not then serving a
sentence for any offense and is not under charge of commission
of any crime, and has, since the order granting probation, lived
an honest and upright life, and has conformed to and obeyed the
laws of the land be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea
of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; or if he has been con-
victed after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict
of guilty. In either case the court shall thereupon dismiss the ac-
cusation or information against such defendant, who shall there-
after be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from
the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. The pro-
bationer shall be informed of the provisions of this section in his
probation papers. The notification shall include the specific penal-
ties and disabilities released by this section. The provisions of this
section are applicable only to defendants who have not previously
been convicted of any offense.5
54. The general language of this proposed statute follows that in CAL. PENAr
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The rights that would be restored by this type of statute would be
determined by weighing the anti-rehabilitative effects of the offender
if the penalty is not removed, against the threat to the public if the
penalty is removed. This requires that the competing interests of the
offender and the public be weighed in situational, rather than cate-
gorical, terms.
This statute would be a pronounced step forward in the process of
rehabilitation. However, even though a person has had his civil rights
restored, if an employer looks at an applicant's record and discovers
that the applicant has been convicted of a felony, such knowledge may
result in the employer's failure to hire the ex-convict. In order to
eliminate this situation, a convict must be offered a reward which he
feels justifies his temporary difficulties. That reward should be the
sealing of the criminal's record. By statute it could be provided that:
Any person who has received relief pursuant to the provision
of the expungement statute may, seven years after the ordering
of such relief, petition the court granting the motion, or any
court of equal jurisdiction, to order the record of the conviction
and all other official records of the case to be destroyed, upon a
showing that the petitioner has lived an honest and upright life
and has conformed to and obeyed the laws of the land. There-
after, such arrest and all proceedings related thereto, including
the dismissal under the expungement statute, shall be deemed not
to have occurred and the petitioner may answer accordingly any
questions relating to their occurrence, and may, if asked, deny
that relief has been sought or granted under this section.55
CODE § 1203.4 (West 1956). The automatic relief granted by this statute would be
limited to first offenders. Traffic offenses, except drunk driving and vehicular homicide,
would not be offenses imposing the specific restrictions of the statute. Another provision
could be made so that second or third offenders are provided some type of relief, but
not automatically. Whether relief should be granted to the multiple offender would
be left entirely to the discretion of a parole or probation board.
55. This proposed sealing statute is basically an extension of the California sealing
statutes. CAL. PEArL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1967); CAL. WELaamm & INsrTrUToNs
CODE § 781 (West 1966), as amended, ch. 1649, 1650, [1967] Cal. Sess. Laws. There is no
data to submit as sufficient support for the suggested waiting period. However, most
felons who are recidivists, become so in the first years out of prison. These felons gen-
erally will be caught and re-incarcerated or they will not be seeking employment which
will better their station in life; consequently, it is the felon that is making an honest
attempt who is penalized most by his failure to be hired when he seeks better employ-
ment. This statute is proposed for the latter's benefit. See generally R. CALDwEr.L,
CmINoLoGY 100-01, 358-60 (2d ed. 1965).
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Restoring one to his professional status after a conviction for a felony
is the area which is considered the greatest threat to the public.
It has been rationalized when one is convicted of a felony, he is not
worthy to occupy a position of public trust or to be an active member
of the profession. In most instances, even a pardon does not restore
professional privileges. This is usually left to the discretion of the
professional licensing or disciplinary board and all too often this board
does not inquire into the circumstances of the offense to determine
whether moral turpitude is involved. To remedy this situation, each
state should have a statute similar to the following:
In a proceeding conducted by a board pursuant to law, to deny
any application for a license or to suspend or revoke a license, or
otherwise take disciplinary action against a person who holds a
license, upon the ground that the applicant or the licensee has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the record
of conviction of the crime shall be conclusive evidence of the
fact that the conviction occurred, but only of that fact, and
the board may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime in order to fix the degree of discipline
or to determine if the conviction is of any offense involving
moral turpitude. The board shall not be bound to disregard a
conviction which has been dismissed under the expungement
statute, but the board shall be required to determine whether
the offense is related to the occupation under the license, and
where the relationship is unsubstantial and the danger to the pub-
lic is remote, the rehabilitation evidenced by a dismissal under
the expungement statute shall be conclusive.56
CONCLUSION
In simple economic terms, it is entirely too expensive to imprison
people when it is not necessary. The cost is approximately $2500 per
year per inmate.57 This is a tremendous and perhaps unnecessary drain
on our economy. Too often, former prisoners will leave the institution
with their criminal behavior patterns more deeply entrenched. 5 In ad-
dition, they will probably be shunned by a respectable society, and,
56. This proposed statute is an extension of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 117 (West 1962).
57. See generally, Article, Criminals Should be Cured, not Caged, 6 AM. CluM. L.Q.
133 (1968); Sultan, Prisons and the Public Purse, 4 Cium. L. BULL. 90 (1968).
58. Margolin, Postinstitutional Rehabilitation of the Criminal Offender: A Comniunity
Effort, 31 FED. PROB. 46 (March 1967).
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as a result, the stage is set for the re-enactment of criminal behavior.
69
To avoid this, the whole commumty can assist by becoming a thera-
peutic partner.60 The three statutes proposed here-would help estab-
lish this therapeutic partnership.
Admittedly, it will not be easy to put these statutes into operation.
It is conceded that many more psychologists, psychiatrists, penologists,
and crimnnologists will have to work much more closely with our
courts. on each individual case. More case workers and probation of-
ficers will be required. -But if rehabilitation is to work at all, the of-
fender must be able to feel that he is a respectable human being. Re-
storing his deprived rights through use of the suggested statutes will
come closest to accomplishing these ends.
JOSEPH H. KELLEY
59. Id. at 47.
60. Id. at 48-50.
